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The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2008: 5) has defined consumer scams as
a fraudulent invitation, request, notification or offer, designed to obtain someone’s 
personal information or money or otherwise obtain a financial benefit by deceptive 
means.
According to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ((ACCC) 2012a), 
scams tend to succeed because they appear legitimate (see also Budd & Anderson 2011; 
Smith & Budd 2009). Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘scams are the hardest security 
threat to protect against because they rely on exploiting naivety rather than technical flaws’ 
(Turner 2011: np).
The ACCC recently updated its Little Black Book of Scams (ACCC 2011), which lists  
15 distinct categories of scam types, including money transfer requests; banking, credit 
card and online account scams; golden investment opportunities and health and medical 
scams (see also Smith 2007).  In 2011, the ACCC received 83,150 scam-related contacts 
from individuals and small businesses, with reported losses of $85.6m, a 35 percent 
increase on 2010 (ACCC 2012b).
Advance fee fraud involves tricking people into paying an advance fee upfront, on the false 
promise that they will receive a large financial or other benefit at some time in the future (see 
Ross & Smith 2011). Examples of these scams include the so-called ‘Nigerian scam’, where 
a scammer offers the intended victim a reward in exchange for helping to transfer money 
(commonly with a fee attached) and fake inheritance scams, where the scammer claims the 
intended victim has been left a large inheritance, but has to first pay costs such as lawyers’ 
fees. Ross and Smith (2011: 1) have suggested that ‘most types of consumer fraud entail 
the use of so-called “advance fee” techniques’.
According to data from the 2007–11 Australasian Consumer Fraud Taskforce (ACFT) survey, 
email predominated as the source of scams, although 2011 data indicated a decrease  
in the use of email as an initial means of contacting people (AIC 2012). Data from the most 
recent Australian Personal Fraud Survey indicate that the national scam exposure rate 
between 2007 and 2010–11 was 36 percent of the population aged 15 years and over,  
with a victimisation rate of three percent (ABS 2012b).
Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive data available in Australia on sentencing 
practices in relation to those convicted of carrying out a scam. In this paper, sentencing in 
such cases is considered, with an emphasis on scams that target individuals, as opposed 
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Foreword | Consumer fraud costs 
Australians almost $1b a year and most 
of this fraud involves scams in which 
individuals are persuaded to part with  
an upfront, or advance, fee, with the 
promise of large financial or other gain  
in the future. 
In this paper, consideration is given to 
the sentencing issues that apply in cases 
of this nature. In particular, the author 
examines the application of the key 
sentencing purposes, such as deterrence 
and rehabilitation, and the sentencing 
principles applied by courts, such as  
the proportionality principle, and the 
challenges that may arise in this context. 
Key sentencing factors often cited  
in aggravation or mitigation are also 
reviewed, before an examination of  
some of the issues relating to specific 
sentencing options is undertaken. This 
paper goes some way in providing a  
brief analysis of sentencing practices. 
However, further research is required to 
better explore how sentencers respond 
to consumer fraud matters.
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to corporations or government agencies. In 
particular, the application of key sentencing 
purposes and principles in such matters is 
discussed, together with sentencing factors 
cited in aggravation or mitigation. The 
sentencing options that apply in the context 
of scamming cases are also discussed.
Purposes of sentencing 
Several Australian jurisdictions set out  
the relevant purposes of sentencing, while 
other jurisdictions remain governed by the 
common law (see ALRC 2006; Mackenzie  
& Stobbs 2010 for discussion).
The key purposes are:
•	 punishment;
•	 deterrence (general and specific);
•	 rehabilitation;
•	 denunciation; and
•	 protection of the community.
However, as Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson 
and Toohey JJ noted in Veen v The Queen 
(No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 476, the 
purposes
overlap and none can be considered  
in isolation from the others when 
determining what is an appropriate 
sentence in a particular case. They are 
guideposts to the appropriate sentence 
but sometimes they point in different 
directions.
In its 2006 review of federal sentencing, the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 
recommended that promoting ‘the restoration 
of relations between the community, the 
offender and the victim’ (ALRC 2006: Rec 
4-1(f)) be included in an exhaustive list of  
the purposes that can be pursued when 
sentencing a federal offender. To date, 
however, ‘restoration does not appear in  
any Australian sentencing legislation as a 
sentencing purpose’ (Mackenzie & Stobbs 
2010: 51). In addition, Smith (nd) has 
suggested that such approaches may  
not be suited to scamming cases.
An additional point in the present context  
is that many scams occur transnationally. 
Consequently, the impact of sentencing 
would likely be different, in terms of general 
deterrence, denunciation and so on, than 
would normally be expected in relation to 
domestic crime.
Application of sentencing purposes 
to sentencing scammers
Scamming cases may result in significant 
loss, not only in terms of financial loss, but 
also broader social impacts, for example, 
loss of trust in others (including commercial 
and/or government institutions) and loss  
of confidence in commercial markets  
(IRGI 2007).
However, the fact that many scammers are 
white-collar offenders may suggest that they 
are inadequately punished for their offending. 
Retired Federal Court judge Ray Finkelstein 
recently criticised ‘the judiciary for being soft 
on white-collar crime’, although it is difficult 
to determine the accuracy of this assertion 
empirically, due in part to the fact that many 
white-collar offenders are diverted from court 
through civil and administrative processes 
(Freiberg 2000). Indeed, Freiberg (2000: 3) 
has suggested that it is ‘not possible to 
determine whether white-collar criminals 
receive more favourable treatment than 
ordinary offenders’, adding that
issues of ‘leniency’ or ‘severity’ are 
difficult to determine in the abstract…
General sentencing levels for offences 
are likely to be misleading because of 
the heterogeneity of cases which come 
before the court and the difficulty in 
identifying which ones are ‘white-collar’ 
related (2000: 4).
Finkelstein noted that general deterrence 
was ‘“usually the sole guiding principle” 
judges used when sentencing white-collar 
criminals’ (Butler 2012: np). General 
deterrence is commonly thought to assume 
a particular significance in the context of 
fraud, especially where the criminal action  
is generally well-planned and carefully 
executed, and offenders can therefore be 
assumed to have conducted a cost–benefit 
analysis of their conduct. Indeed, it is not 
improbable that the operators of a bogus 
work-from-home scheme would be deterred 
if they learned of the sentences received for 
similar schemes. There also remains a place 
for specific deterrence in the present 
context, especially where the penalty might 
otherwise simply be disregarded as the cost 
of doing business.
In the case of Nikaghanri v Western Australia 
[2009] WASCA 192, the offender committed 
an advance fee fraud against five victims. 
On the appeal against his sentence, the 
Court found at [17] that ‘the repetition of  
the offending demonstrates that significant 
weight had to be given to the need for 
personal deterrence in addition to general 
deterrence’.
A key point in relation to rehabilitation is  
that many scammers show significant 
business acumen, technological nous and 
entrepreneurship. Accordingly, adopting a 
rehabilitative model may assist offenders in 
harnessing their skills in a pro-social way.  
To this end, the Prison Entrepreneurship 
Program, which was first developed in 
Texas, may provide a useful model. The 
program links executives and prisoners 
through entrepreneurial education and 
mentoring, and engages business and 
academic talent to redirect inmates’ 
energies in a constructive way, which will 
enable them to productively re-enter society. 
In 2007, it was reported that in the first  
three years of the program, its graduates 
had a return-to-prison rate of 3.7 percent, 
compared with a national average of  
50 percent (Rohr 2007). According to the 
most recent data available, by July 2010, 
over 90 percent of the 600 graduates had 
been legitimately employed within three 
months of their release from prison, with  
75 new businesses started (PEP 2012).
Finally, denunciation may be relied on as a 
means of expressing disapproval. As the 
ALRC has noted (2006: [4.18]), the courts, 
through their denunciatory role, ‘seek to 
educate both the offender and the public 
about correct moral values’, with sentences 
that denounce the offender’s conduct 
representing ‘a symbolic, collective 
statement of society’s disapproval of the 
criminal behaviour’. In the case of R v 
Shannon [2005] VSCA 143, the offender 
pleaded guilty to 28 counts of obtaining 
property by deception after raising more 
than $7m through bogus raffles, which 
purported to raise funds for a children’s 
charity. Nettle JA commented at [9] that  
the offences
represent fraudulent conduct on a  
very large scale. They warrant condign 
punishment in order to express  
the Court’s denunciation and the 
community’s intolerance of offending  
of that kind.
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Sentencing principles 
Australian courts are required to apply  
the following sentencing principles when 
sentencing an individual offender.
Proportionality principle
The principle of proportionality requires 
courts to impose sentences that bear a 
proportionate relationship to the criminal 
conduct in question. The principle operates 
to prevent the imposition of sentences that 
are manifestly excessive or lenient (Warner 
2002; see also ALRC 2006; Edney & 
Bagaric 2007; Mackenzie & Stobbs 2010).
It might be argued that as scams become 
more extensive and sophisticated, judicial 
officers may come to see lenient sentences 
as disproportionate to the gravity of the 
offence, especially having regard to the 
number of victims and the extent of the  
loss suffered. As Smith, Grabosky and 
Urbas (2004: 107) noted:
Cyber crimes raise new concerns about 
proportionality, as the consequences of 
some types of offending can be great, 
and yet the conduct itself involves no 
physical violence.
Parsimony principle
The parsimony principle operates to prevent 
the imposition of a sentence that is more 
severe than that necessary to achieve  
the purpose(s) of the sentence (eg see 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(3)). Courts  
will likely be more willing to impose a 
parsimonious sentence on a scammer when 
rehabilitation is seen as the main goal than 
where the objective is deterrence or 
punishment.
Totality principle
The totality principle applies where an 
offender is sentenced for multiple offences 
or is already serving an earlier sentence and 
seeks to ensure an appropriate sentence 
overall (see Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 
59). One key implication of this principle  
is that it appears to benefit high-volume 
offenders. For example, an offender will not 
receive twice as long a sentence if 200 people 
fall for a scam than if 100 people had done 
so. In the case of Marinellis v The Queen 
[2006] NSWCCA 307, the NSW Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that the sentencing 
judge was inappropriately lenient in ordering 
the sentences for 10 charges of fraud to be 
served concurrently, ‘because each offence 
was independent and involved different 
victims’ (McAdams J at [34]), but this was 
still required to be subject to the totality 
principle. In that case, the offender was  
the ‘Australian clearinghouse’ for an 
international syndicate that created 
fraudulent transactions that induced victims 
to make contact with the offender for the 
processing of funds. By the time the victims 
were asked to contact the offender, they 
had been supplied with false Nigerian 
government documents, emails and faxes 
and other information from fictitious security 
companies, as well as details of the money 
they would receive.
Consistency/parity principle
Consistency in sentencing is regarded as 
fundamental to a fair and equitable criminal 
justice system and ensures that two offenders 
who have committed similar crimes and 
have similar personal circumstances  
are going to receive a similar sentence  
(see ALRC 2006 for discussion). In order  
to promote consistency for offences of  
this nature, it is vital that that there be 
comprehensive research that compares  
like instances of offending, including across 
jurisdictional borders.
The parity principle, which may be regarded 
as a subset of the consistency principle 
(ALRC 2006), requires offenders who have 
jointly engaged in the same type of criminal 
conduct to generally receive similar sentences, 
although courts can take into account 
different levels of culpability and individual 
circumstances. This will, of course, have 
particular relevance where there may be 
multiple co-offenders participating in the 
same scam.
Individualised justice
Finally, the principle of individualised justice 
requires the court to impose a sentence  
that is just and appropriate in all the 
circumstances of the particular case. As 
Mahoney ACJ said in Kable v DPP (NSW) 
(1995) 36 NSWLR 374 at 394, ‘if justice is 
not individual, it is nothing’. Judicial officers 
therefore need to have sufficient discretion 
to consider all the facts when sentencing  
an offender and ideally, have enough 
sentencing options to tailor their sentence  
to the offender’s individual circumstances. 
The recent observation by Selvadurai, Islam 
and Gillies (2010) that there needs to be 
greater flexibility in sentencing, given the 
wide spectrum of identity fraud-related 
activities, is clearly apposite in this context.
Sentencing factors
Over 220 factors appear to influence 
sentencing courts (La Trobe University  
1980; Shapland 1981; see Bartels 2009  
for discussion). Factors may be classed  
as aggravating or mitigating (see Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)  
s 21A), but the legislation in most jurisdictions 
(eg Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 16A(2)) reflects 
the fact that this will depend on the 
circumstances (see ALRC 2006).
The following factors represent some of the 
key factors in Australian sentencing law (see 
Edney & Bagaric 2007; Mackenzie & Stobbs 
2010; Warner 2002), which may be of 
particular relevance in scamming cases. The 
cases cited serve as examples of instances 
where a particular factor has been cited  
by the court, although it is not suggested 
that they are representative of how courts 
consider the competing factors in all such 
cases.
Factors relevant to the offence
Factors that relate to the offence itself are 
principally concerned with the nature and 
seriousness of the offence. One key means 
of determining this is the legislative view of 
gravity, that is, the maximum penalty laid 
down by the legislation (see Markarian v The 
Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 for discussion).
Another important consideration is breach  
of trust, which is an aggravating factor (see 
Edney & Bagaric 2007; Warner 2002). This 
may be of particular relevance in the context 
of banking, health or superannuation scams, 
or where the offender holds a particular 
position. For example, in the case of R v 
Street [2007] VSCA 185, the offender was  
a financial adviser who defrauded five clients 
of over $1m in an advance fee fraud. In 
dismissing the offender’s sentence appeal, 
King AJA, with whom Vincent JA and Smith 
AJA agreed, referred to the breach of trust, 
noting at [45] that it was
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expected that those involved in crimes 
of this nature have no prior convictions, 
and occupy positions of trust which give 
them the ability to easily abuse their 
position.
Intention and consequences are also relevant 
considerations (Edney & Bagaric 2007; 
Warner 2002); it may therefore be aggravating 
that the consequences of a scam involved 
significant financial damage to an individual. 
Conversely, where little financial damage 
was suffered, or where the offender did not 
foresee the extent of the damage (eg if the 
scam went much further than anticipated), 
this may limit liability.
Motive is also relevant to sentencing 
outcomes, with Chief Justice Spigelman 
stating in R v Swan [2006] NSWCCA  
47 at [61]: 
Motive is always a relevant factor.  
It affects the moral culpability of the 
offender, the weight to be given to 
personal deterrence and may affect  
the weight to be given to general 
deterrence.
As Hessick (2006: 146) has argued in 
relation to property offending more generally, 
if an offender’s motive is
not simply to profit personally, but to 
help care for a severely disabled family 
member, she has probably distinguished 
herself sufficiently from the ordinary 
defendant who acts for a financial 
motive, and she is thus entitled to a 
sentence reduction.
Conversely, where scams are motivated  
by pure greed, this will be aggravating (see 
eg Marinellis v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 
307). Another consideration is the method 
of execution, especially the extent of 
sophistication involved in planning and 
executing the offence, with Edney and 
Bagaric (2007) noting that offences that 
involve a high degree of planning are difficult 
to detect, investigate and prosecute. 
Accordingly, it may be aggravating to carry 
out a scam that closely imitates a legitimate 
government or corporate website or logo. 
To this end, the SCG, discussed below, lists 
careful planning as an aggravating factor.
An offender’s degree of participation is  
also relevant (Warner 2002), with principal 
offenders generally receiving more severe 
penalties than those who have only played  
a minor role, although this is subject to the 
parity principle discussed above. In practice, 
however, it may be difficult to determine  
the role played by each offender, especially 
where numerous transactions and/or victims 
are involved.
The victim is also a relevant consideration 
(see Edney & Bagaric 2007; Fox & Freiberg 
1999; Warner 2002). First, their vulnerability 
may aggravate an offence. Second, the 
victim’s response to the offence and the 
impact on the victim may be relevant; for 
example, if they suffer long-term financial  
or other harm.
Finally, the prevalence of an offence might 
be a relevant consideration; for example, if  
a particular offence has been increasing 
over a period of time or in a particular area, 
this can be taken into consideration by  
the court. It may, however, be difficult to 
accurately determine prevalence, especially 
with scams that are perpetrated across 
national and international borders. In 
Sweeney v O’Brien [2010] NTSC 18, where 
the offender unlawfully obtained money 
using another person’s identity, a sentence 
appeal was allowed in part on the basis of 
the lack of evidence about the prevalence  
of identity fraud.
Factors relevant to the offender
Whether an offender has previous 
convictions is regarded as ‘one of the most 
important factors in a sentencing hearing’ 
(Mackenzie & Stobbs 2010: 62). A linked 
issue is the offender’s good character, such 
as volunteer work in the community (see 
Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267 for 
discussion). In this context, some white-
collar offenders will be able to draw on 
unblemished characters and clean prior 
records to mitigate their sentence. For 
example, in a 1990s case, Warren Bund 
defrauded more than $2.3m from a business 
consortium as part of a Nigerian scam, but 
was described as being  ‘a highly respected 
businessman and a devout member of 
Adelaide’s Jewish community’ (Owen-Brown 
1999).
The offender’s mental and physical health 
are also important considerations (see R v 
Tsiaris [1996] 1 VR 398). In R v Street [2007] 
VSCA 185, the offender appealed against 
the sentence imposed for the advance  
fee fraud he had committed against five 
victims, arguing that the sentencing judge 
had given insufficient weight to the fact that 
the offender suffered from bipolar disorder. 
However, King AJA held (with Vincent JA 
and Smith AJA agreeing) that this was to  
be balanced against other factors, including 
the breach of trust, the duration of the 
offending, the number of separate 
transactions and total money involved,  
the sophisticated and calculated nature  
of the false representations and the steps 
taken to ensure that no one would be  
able to discover that the money was being 
transferred to Nigeria. Significantly, the 
medical evidence was found not to support 
the argument that the applicant’s mental 
condition was causally involved in the 
offending.
Previous research has indicated a strong 
connection between fraud and gambling 
(see AIC 2008) and courts recognise 
gambling addiction as a relevant factor, 
albeit only of limited mitigating value (see 
Edney & Bagaric 2007 for discussion). In  
R v Rigianis [2010] NSWDC 116, the 
offender pleaded guilty to an investment 
scam. In sentencing the offender, Berman 
DCJ considered the fact that the offender 
was a ‘pathological gambler’ but noted at 
[36] that although gambling ‘may explain 
some of the offender’s misconduct…it does 
not mitigate it’ (see also R v Grossi [2008] 
VSCA 51, where the relevance of 
pathological gambling in sentencing was 
considered in detail).
Response to the charges
The offender’s behaviour after the offence  
is relevant to the sentence. First, pleading 
guilty is an important mitigating factor 
(Edney & Bagaric 2007; Mackenzie & 
Stobbs 2010; Warner 2002), although the 
weight to be given to this will vary, especially 
depending on the time when the plea is 
entered and the strength of the prosecution 
case. Many consumer fraud cases will 
involve both large numbers of victims and 
significant paperwork around what financial 
transactions took place when. Accordingly, 
there may be a large discount for early pleas 
on the basis of their utilitarian value in 
reducing court costs and delays.
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Another factor (often, but not always, linked 
with a guilty plea) is the presence of remorse 
or contrition, which Kirby J described in 
Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 
at [65] as having ‘always been treated as 
deserving of...recognition in the sentencing 
of an accused’. This will carry greater weight 
whether they are accompanied by some 
action, for example, apologies to victims  
or efforts towards restitution. Restitution or 
reparation are separate mitigating factors 
(see O’Keefe [1959] Qd R 395), which  
may achieve a degree of restoration for  
the victim, but it is generally argued that  
an offender should not be able to ‘bargain 
with the court’ or ‘buy their way out of 
sentences’ (see Warner 2002: 110). This is 
particularly apposite in the present context, 
where scammers may amass considerable 
wealth from their crimes. Conversely, as the 
UK Sentencing Guidelines Council (SCG) 
(2009: 11) has noted
providing an incentive to return property 
or money is particularly important as it 
may be difficult for a victim to recover his 
or her losses in any other way.
Finally, providing cooperation and assistance 
to law enforcement authorities can carry 
substantial mitigating weight, especially 
where the offender volunteers offences of 
which the authorities would not otherwise 
have been aware or gives evidence against 
co-offenders (Edney & Bagaric 2007; 
Mackenzie & Stobbs 2010; Warner 2002). 
Again, in fraud cases, which can be 
cross-jurisdictional, highly sophisticated  
and involve multiple offenders, the ability  
of the court to recognise an offender’s 
cooperation, at times at great risk to 
themselves, is an important part of the 
sentencing discretion.
Effect of the offence and sanction
Another category of factors relates to the 
effect of the offence and sanction on the 
offenders and in some circumstances, 
others, such as the offender’s family. In 
particular, it may be a mitigating fact that  
the offender has suffered extra-curial 
punishment through public exposure and 
loss of position, status or income (see Warner 
2002; for a critique, see Mackenzie & Stobbs 
2010). This may again advantage middle-
class offenders and is clearly relevant in the 
context of fraud offenders who have hidden 
behind a mask of respectability to help them 
perpetrate their crimes.
UK Sentencing Guidelines Council
The SCG recently handed down guidelines 
for sentencing in statutory fraud offences, in 
which it stated that the ‘primary consideration 
when sentencing fraud offences is the 
seriousness of the offending behaviour’ 
(SCG 2009: 4). The SCG suggested that in 
determining the seriousness of an offence, 
culpability and the harm caused should be 
determined by reference to factors including:
•	 the impact (including risk of physical 
harm) of the offence on the victim and the 
harm or risk of harm (including physical 
harm) to the victim or others;
•	 erosion of public confidence;
•	 the difference between the loss intended 
and the actual loss that resulted; and
•	 any legitimate entitlement to any of the 
money obtained.
Aggravating factors relating to the 
seriousness of the offence include where:
•	 an offence was carefully planned;
•	 there was a high level of profit;
•	 an attempt was made to conceal or 
dispose of evidence;
•	 there was deliberate targeting of 
vulnerable/multiple victims;
•	 there was a breach of trust; and/or
•	 there was use of another person’s identity.
Mitigating factors nominated by the SCG 
include:
•	 mental illness or disability;
•	 where the offender played only a minor 
role in the fraud;
•	 that the behaviour was not fraudulent 
from the outset (ie the offender originally 
had a legitimate claim to the money), or 
the offender was involved on the basis  
of misleading information;
•	 voluntary cessation of offending;
•	 restitution and disclosure of the extent  
of the fraud; and/or
•	 financial pressures to which the offender 
was subject.
In light of the paucity of research and clear 
guidance in Australia this area, it may be  
of benefit for Australian researchers, 
policymakers, practitioners and judicial 
officers to collaborate in developing 
guidelines such as those finalised by the 
SCG in order to promote consistency of 
approach in similar cases (eg the importance 
of denunciation and general deterrence in 
such cases). The need for a harmonised 
approach is particularly desirable, given  
the likely inter-jurisdictional nature of the 
offences. However, the broad range of 
charges under which scams can be 
prosecuted, in addition to the need for 
individualised justice, makes it undesirable 
to set down any prescriptive mandatory 
minimum sentences.
Sentencing options
There is a broad range of sentencing 
options available to judicial officers. Some  
of the key considerations that arise in  
the present context include the fact  
that dismissals, community service and 
probation orders will generally be limited  
to minor cases, given the relatively low 
threshold (eg 320 hours community service 
under the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 
1988 (SA) s 47(1)). By contrast, fines may 
have a high maximum threshold (eg 
$110,000 under the Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 15, 17). 
Sentences of imprisonment may also be 
lengthy; internationally, there are instances 
of scammers receiving terms of up to 150 
years, such as in the case of Bernie Madoff 
(Teather 2009).
Substitutional orders of imprisonment,  
such as suspended sentences and home 
detention, are formally sentences of 
imprisonment that are not served in a 
custodial facility. The advantage of these 
sentences is that the offender can remain  
in employment and may thereby be able  
to make a valuable contribution to society, 
including one that ameliorates some of the 
effect of their crimes. One major issue here, 
however, is that well-off offenders will suffer 
a relatively more lenient penalty than those 
who live in less palatial surroundings and 
this form of punishment may therefore also 
benefit white-collars scammers (see Moran 
2011).
Courts can also make orders for restitution, 
reparation, compensation and/or forfeiture, 
generally as an ancillary order (eg s 110(1) of 
the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) provides that 
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a reparation order ‘is in addition to and not 
part of the sentence imposed on an offender’). 
Orders of this nature serve as a means of 
recouping stolen funds, as well as goods 
used in the commission of the crime, and 
can be quite considerable in scope. For 
example, in an American case, an offender 
was ordered to pay $30m in restitution for 
his involvement in a concert promotion 
Ponzi scheme (US Attorney’s Office 2011).
Restrictions on the use of 
computers as a sanction
The court may order an offender to forfeit 
computer equipment or other sources of 
technology used in the commission of the 
crime, either as an ancillary order or as  
a condition of sentence. In an analysis of  
33 cases where courts imposed forfeiture  
or restriction-of-use orders in relation to 
computers, Smith (2004) argued that orders 
of this nature would be appropriate where 
reasonably linked to the purposes 
underlying the order (such as deterrence  
or incapacitation), so long as they involve no 
greater deprivation of liberty than necessary 
(ie not breach the parsimony principle) and 
are not overly broad.
However, this is to be balanced against the 
now widespread use of computers in many 
aspects of daily life, including those that 
would promote an offender’s rehabilitation, 
for example, if the offender would thereby 
be prevented from being gainfully employed. 
This might, in turn, have an impact on their 
ability to make restitution for their crimes. In 
addition, the potential impact on others 
must be considered. In a Queensland  
case in Smith’s study (2004), for example,  
it was found that ordering the forfeiture  
of a computer on which the offender had 
accessed child pornography would have 
been detrimental to the offender’s children; 
this could possibly be seen as a violation of 
the proportionality principle discussed above.
There may also be issues of enforceability, 
especially where offenders could use other 
people’s computers to circumvent the 
intention of the order (eg by using a 
computer at public library), or where others 
have a legitimate and unrestricted right to 
use the same computer as the offender. 
Finally, as Smith (2004) acknowledged,  
in spite of the increasingly sophisticated 
monitoring or filtering software, many 
scammers will be more technologically 
adept than the probation services monitoring 
them and therefore able to evade detection.
At the other end of the sentencing 
spectrum, Smith (2004) has suggested that 
courts could order offenders to use their 
technological know-how in a constructive 
way, for example, by performing community 
service that builds on their expertise, or 
delivering cautionary warnings about fraud 
to would-be offenders and/or victims. Quite 
how judicial officers would craft and enforce 
such orders in scamming cases remains to 
be seen, but this approach may be worthy 
of further examination.
Conclusion
The ABS (2008) has estimated that 
consumer frauds cost Australians almost 
$1b each year, although it would appear 
that only a small proportion of these are 
reported to police (ACCC 2012b; Smith 
2007; Smith & Akman 2008). In spite of the 
apparent prevalence of consumer fraud and 
scams, there is currently little information on 
sentencing practices in relation to offences 
of this nature. This appears to be due in part 
to the range of offences that might be 
classified as scams and the lack of national 
sentencing data generally. The fact that  
only five percent of fraud matters finalised  
in 2010–11 were resolved in the higher 
courts (ABS 2012a) may also impede the 
development of a clear understanding of the 
operation of sentencing principles in practice.
This paper has sought to go some way to 
filling the gap by providing an introduction  
to Australian sentencing law, with reference 
to actual and theoretical application in the 
context of scamming cases. The key 
sentencing purposes, such as general and 
specific deterrence, were considered. The 
principles that courts are bound to apply in 
sentencing an individual offender, such as 
the totality principle, were also considered. 
The paper then presented an overview of 
some of the key aggravating and mitigating 
sentencing factors that may be of particular 
relevance in such cases. Examples of 
factors relating to the offence, to the 
offender, the offender’s response to the 
charges and the effect of the offence and 
sanction were illustrated by recent case law 
examples. The approach of the UK SCG 
was also discussed. Finally, the key 
sentencing options available to the courts 
and the issues these may present in the 
context of scamming cases were explored, 
especially in relation to the imposition of 
restrictions on the use of computers used  
to commit the offence.
There is a growing level of awareness about 
the nature and scope of scams of this nature 
(see ACCC 2011; 2012a; 2012b; Smith 
2007; Smith & Akman 2008; Smith & Budd 
2009). What is required now, however, is 
greater guidance for criminologists and legal 
practitioners about how sentencers do and 
should respond to such cases. Research is 
therefore required on the types of sentences 
currently imposed in consumer fraud cases, 
including any jurisdictional variation. An 
exploration of the extent to which the 
sentencing factors discussed in this paper 
appear to influence sentencing outcomes 
would also be instructive; particular 
consideration should be given to the 
desirability of adopting the UK model  
in setting out guidelines for the courts  
to consider. The operation of sentencing 
principles in cases of this nature, for 
example, the operation of the totality 
principle in cases that may involve potentially 
thousands of victims, would also be 
instructive. Finally, research on the purposes 
of sentencing adopted by the courts, including 
the relevance of restoration as a sentencing 
objective, would also assist in determining in 
which directions the guideposts point when 
sentencing scammers.
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